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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Italian corporate governance system has been 
strengthened in the last decade to increase 
transparency in the management of companies and 
to increase the protection for minority shareholders. 
Laws and regulations have reinforced the control 
functions of companies. This paper addresses this 
issue by providing an empirical analysis of the 
quality, composition, and structure of the 
composition of the corporate governance of Italian 
companies and identifying the determinants that 
affect it. 
As stated in previous research, the Italian 
corporate governance system has been considered 
as weak, characterized by an inactive takeover 
market, poor accounting standards, limited presence 
of institutional investors, and minimal legal 
protection for investors (Bianchi & Enriques, 2005; 
Buchanan & Yang, 2005; Ciampi, 2015). 
Since 1998, with the introduction of the 
“Draghi law”, the Italian corporate governance 
system reinforced the internal control systems of 
companies to restore confidence among investors by 
encouraging information and communication 
transparency (Cortesi et al., 2008; Melis & Rombi, 
2018). Furthermore, the first introduction of the 
Corporate Governance Code (1999) focused on the 
role and the importance of bodies of control. In 
particular, to improve the effectiveness of 
operations, the reliability of financial reporting, and 
compliance with applicable laws and regulations, the 
code and the corporate governance debate has 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
How to cite this paper: Rizzato, F., 
Busso, D., Devalle, A., & Zerbetto, A. 
(2018). Corporate governance system in 
Italy: Compliance and quality. Corporate 
Ownership & Control, 16(1-1), 217-233. 
http://doi.org/10.22495/cocv16i1c1art9 
 
Copyright © 2018 The Authors 
 
This work is licensed under the Creative 
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 
4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0). 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc/4.0/ 
 
ISSN Online: 1810-3057 
ISSN Print: 1727-9232 
 
Received: 13.10.2018 
Accepted: 16.01.2019 
JEL Classification: G30, G32 
DOI: 10.22495/cocv16i1c1art9 
 
 
The Italian corporate governance system has been strengthened 
in the last decade to increase transparency in the management of 
companies and to increase the protection for minority 
shareholders. This paper addresses this concern by providing an 
empirical analysis of the composition and structure of the 
corporate governance system of Italian companies and its 
compliance with the Italian and international corporate 
governance standards, and identifying the determinants of the 
compliance. The sample comprises 159 listed companies 
belonging to the Italian Stock Exchange (FTSE Italia All-Share) 
in 2013. By means of a Corporate Governance Index (CG index) 
made up of 15 items, this paper defines the determinants that 
affect the compliance of the corporate governance structure of 
Italian companies. Our study uses an ordinary least square 
regression model to determine the independent variables that can 
influence the CG index of groups listed on the Italian regulated 
market, in accordance with international literature in this area. 
Results show that there is still a moderate level of compliance 
with the Italian and international corporate governance 
standards, with differences depending on the size of the 
company. Furthermore, our research shows that the presence of 
institutional investors increases the score of the CG index, 
whereas family ownership results in a significant and negative 
correlation. Furthermore, as a typical issue in the Italian context, 
we found that leverage has a significant and positive influence on 
the composition of corporate governance and its compliance with 
international standards. 
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focused on the independent monitoring power given 
to certain institutional actors inside and outside 
business organizations (Ianiello, 2015). 
The first objective of this research is to 
investigate, through empirical analysis, the status of 
the corporate governance composition and structure 
of Italian listed companies and its compliance with 
Italian and international governance standards by 
means of a Corporate Governance Index (CG index). 
The objective of the CG index is to analyse the 
composition, compliance, and quality of the 
corporate governance of the Italian listed groups. 
The CG index comprises 15 items grouped into 
different categories: composition of the board, 
composition of the internal committees, and the role 
of minorities. Specifically, the CG index is based on 
determining whether the qualitative and quantitative 
requirements of the code are satisfied, together with 
certain requirements of the most authoritative 
international corporate governance standards and 
the items used in the international scholarly 
literature on the topic. Two governance standards 
were used as sources. The main source was the 
Corporate Governance Code for companies listed in 
Italy and drawn up by the Italian Stock Exchange 
Committee for Corporate Governance, which was 
published in March 2006 and amended in March 
2010 and December 201123. As we used the financial 
statements of Italian listed companies for the fiscal 
year 2013, the index focuses on the December 2011 
code version. The second source was constituted of 
internationally recognized standards: the global 
governance principles developed by the 
International Corporate Governance Network and 
published in 2014. 
The sample was made up of the listed 
companies belonging to the Italian Stock Exchange 
(FTSE Italia All-Share). The composition of the index 
refers to the year 2013, for which 159 listed 
companies were analysed; for each company, we 
collected 15 items to feed the CG index. Data were 
collected from the 2013 corporate governance report 
of each company. 
The final objective of this study is to 
investigate the determinants that influence the 
composition, quality, and compliance of corporate 
governance (Meier & Meier, 2014; Cunha & 
Rodrigues, 2018), as Black et al. (2012) claim that 
country characteristics strongly predict which 
aspects of governance matter. To do this, for each 
entity, we collected 10 independent variables divided 
into ownership, size, financial debt exposure, and 
others (Carson, 1996). In total, we had collected 
3,975 items. 
The methodology used to assess the 
determinants of the quality and compliance of 
corporate governance is based on the OLS regression 
model consistent with the main literature review 
(Stanga, 1976; McNally et al., 1982; Chow & Wong-
Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989; Botosan, 1997; 
Depoers, 2000; Glaum & Street, 2003; Cunha & 
Rodrigues, 2018). Results show that there is a 
moderate level of compliance with Italian and 
international corporate governance standards, with 
differences depending on the size of the company. 
Our research shows that the presence of 
institutional investors increases the score of the 
index, whereas family ownership results in a 
significant decrease. 
                                                          
23
Minor amendments were made in July 2014 and July 2015. 
Furthermore, the leverage variable is also 
positive and significant. This result is a distinctive 
feature of the Italian market, where the role of the 
banking systems is more important than in other 
countries (Devalle et al., 2016). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 describes corporate governance 
functions and laws prescribed in the Italian context; 
Section 3 develops the hypotheses; Section 4 
discusses the sample and presents the model; 
Section 5 includes the test, regression, analysis, and 
results; and Section 6 summarizes the main findings 
of the study. 
 
2.  THE ITALIAN CONTEXT 
 
The Italian corporate governance framework is made 
up of laws and standards. In Italy, the responsibility 
for internal controls was introduced in the “Draghi 
law” (1998), even though the internal control system 
was not defined. The manager responsible for the 
internal control function must be independent of 
other managers. The major listed companies have 
established an internal auditing function and 
identified the head of that function as the manager 
responsible for the internal control system. The 
internal auditing function is focused on “operating 
controls” that are oriented to managing and to 
minimizing operating risks. 
For the first time in the Italian framework of 
corporate governance, the Corporate Governance 
Code (CG Code, 1999) defined the importance of the 
internal control system and introduced the 
definition provided by the Coso Report. 
In 2003 the Civil Code was reformed, as the 
Italian system was characterized by a highly 
inefficient control system and a totally inadequate 
institutional structure (Cortesi et al., 2008). 
After the Parmalat scandal, the “Draghi law” 
was modified by the savings law (Law 262/2005). 
The Savings Law, which aimed at protecting savings 
and regulating financial markets, came into force on 
January 12, 2006. 
In addition to the application of these laws, 
Italian companies have to comply with the new 
versions of the Corporate Governance Code first 
published in March 2006. One of the objectives of 
the code was to provide best practices to increase 
the protection for minorities by improving the 
structure of corporate governance and its bodies. To 
do this, the Corporate Governance Code moved from 
a voluntary approach to a comply-or-explain 
approach. Thus, companies have to disclose in the 
corporate governance report if they comply with the 
CG code or explain the reasons why they do not. 
To reinforce the corporate governance of a 
company, board of directors (BoD) composition is a 
key topic. 
The board of directors shall be made up of 
executive and non-executive directors, who should 
be adequately competent and professional. 
Furthermore, listed companies must specify which 
directors are compliant with independence 
requirements and, concerning the procedure for the 
appointment of the directors, the bylaws have to 
specify the minimum percentage of votes that each 
slate must obtain. At least one independent director 
must be appointed if there are no more than seven 
members, while two independent directors are 
required if there are more than seven directors. The 
role of independent directors is to provide an 
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independent, unbiased judgement on proposed 
resolutions since they are not directly involved in 
the operational running of the company. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that a higher 
proportion of independent directors on corporate 
boards would result in more effective monitoring of 
boards and limit the managerial opportunism. Since 
independent directors are in a better position to 
discipline management, they are expected to be 
more effective in prohibiting opportunistic 
behaviours, thereby reducing potential agency 
conflicts (Kren & Kerr, 1997; Altunbas et al., 2001; 
Bebchuk et al., 2009; Pathan, 2009). Yeh et al. (2011) 
suggest that independent directors can help a firm 
by actively providing their expertise, prestige, and 
monitoring power. 
One of the recommendations of the Italian code 
of corporate governance is in regard to the balance 
of power within the board; thus a separation 
between the CEO and the chairman is advisable. In 
the case of CEO duality (or the case in which the 
chairman is the person who owns the firm), it is 
suggested that a lead independent director is 
appointed, to rebalance the powers within the board. 
In the UK and the US, the dual appointment of 
chairman and CEO is seen as giving too much power 
to the individual (Jensen, 1993). 
Within the BoD, the CG code suggests the 
introduction of different committees, for control 
and risk, compensation, and remuneration. 
The control and risk committee comprises 
independent directors, or alternatively, the 
committee can be made up of non-executive 
directors, the majority of whom are independent 
ones; in this case, the chairman of the committee is 
selected from among the independent directors. If 
the issue is controlled by another listed company or 
is subject to the direction and coordination activity 
of another company, the committee shall be made 
up exclusively of independent directors. The role of 
the control and risk committee is primarily to define 
the guidelines of the internal control and risk 
management system. 
The nomination committee, comprising mostly 
independent directors, has the role of 
recommending the procedure to be followed for the 
appointment of the directors, which should ensure 
transparency and balanced composition of the 
board. 
The remuneration committee is made up of 
independent directors, or alternatively, of non-
executive directors, the majority of whom will be 
independent. The remuneration committee has to 
evaluate the adequacy, overall consistency, and 
actual application of the policy for the remuneration 
of directors and key management personnel. 
Since board committees reflect different 
dimensions of expertise, independent directors on 
different committees allow for varied involvements 
in representing the interests of the shareholders 
(Brennan & McDermott, 2004; Ravina & 
Sapienza, 2010). John and Senbet (1998) indicate 
that there is a strong propensity towards non-
insiders serving on board committees. 
A board of statutory auditors is mandatory and 
one of the most important auditing and control 
bodies in Italian companies24. The “Draghi law” 
(Article 149) states that this board shall check 
                                                          
24 For an analysis of the function of the board of statutory auditors, see Melis 
(2004). 
compliance with the law and company bylaws; 
observance of the principles of correct 
administration; adequacy of the company‟s 
organizational structure for matters within the 
scope of the board‟s authority; adequacy of the 
internal control, administrative, and accounting 
systems; reliability of the latter incorrectly 
representing the company's transactions; 
arrangements for implementing the corporate 
governance rules provided for in codes of conduct, 
drawn up by management companies of regulated 
markets or by trade associations that the company, 
by means of public disclosures, declares it complies 
with; and adequacy of the instructions imparted by 
the company to its subsidiaries. 
In 2001, Legislative Decree 231/2001 was 
issued, stating that companies are responsible for 
crimes committed by managers and employees in 
the company‟s interest. This responsibility is called 
“administrative responsibility” because it concerns 
organizations and not people. Sanctions are both 
economic and “administrative”. Examples of 
administrative sanctions are disqualification from 
public contracts or any business connections with 
government bodies and companies. Private 
companies could escape these sanctions if they are 
able to demonstrate that their internal control 
system effectively prevents crimes committed by 
managers and employees. The body of the company 
that verifies the compliance of the internal control 
system with Legislative Decree 231/2001 is called 
the supervisory board, which shall be the board of 
statutory auditors. Legislative Decree (L.D.) 
231/2001 provides for the following crimes: crimes 
against the civil service and other government 
bodies, civil law crimes, market abuse, etc. To be 
exempted from the responsibility provided by L.D. 
231/2001, the company has to establish 
organizational models and control systems suitable 
for preventing the committing of crimes and has to 
establish a supervisory board that supervises the 
effectiveness of the organizational models and the 
control system. 
After the international and national financial 
scandal, a new position was added: the manager in 
charge of preparing a company‟s financial reports 
(Law 262/2005). This manager shall put appropriate 
administrative and accounting procedures in place 
for preparing the annual accounts report and, where 
provided for, the consolidated accounts and every 
other disclosure of a financial nature (Article 154 
bis). Moreover, the manager responsible and the CEO 
are now required to certify that accounts correspond 
to the ledgers and the accounting records. The 
manager in charge of preparing the company‟s 
financial report coincides with the chief financial 
officer of the company and is responsible for the 
internal control system related to accounting data. 
Another mandatory body of control is the auditor, 
who is appointed or revoked by the shareholders‟ 
meeting following a grounded proposal by the board 
of statutory auditors; the appointment lasts nine 
financial years and is not renewable. 
As previously illustrated, many bodies of 
control were introduced into the Italian governance 
laws and regulations, and the objective of this paper 
is to focus on the quality and the composition of the 
internal control structure of Italian companies. 
In this study, we collected data from the report 
of corporate governance of listed Italian companies 
to verify the composition of the governance of a 
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company, assigning a score by means of an index 
(CG index). Indexes were widely used in the research 
of corporate governance to verify the quality and the 
effectiveness of the internal control. With reference 
to the Italian context, Regoliosi et al. (2014) analysed 
the quality of the internal auditing department by 
means of an internal audit department‟s global 
quality index (IAD index). The results showed that 
there are significant associations (positive and 
negative) between the degree of compliance with 
some corporate governance regulations for listed 
firms and the IAD index. Allegrini et al. (2013) 
regressed a voluntary disclosure index on seven 
governance variables related either to the board 
structure or functioning with reference to an Italian 
sample of listed companies. The findings showed a 
positive relation between board size and diligence 
with voluntary disclosure. 
Our research defined an overall index with 15 
items to assess the structure and quality of the 
corporate governance of listed Italian companies, 
analysing 159 listed companies. We regressed the IC 
index to test the determinants that influence the IC 
index. 
Our research contributes to the literature by 
providing results on corporate governance and its 
effectiveness with a wide sample of the Italian 
market. This research is also useful for legislators, 
to define the mandatory or voluntary composition of 
corporate governance to reinforce the protection for 
shareholders. 
 
3. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
 
This study investigates which group of a firm‟s 
characteristics produce a better composition of 
corporate governance in Italy, where national-level 
variables play a significant role (Aguilera & 
Jackson, 2003; Kumar & Zattoni, 2013; Aslan & 
Kumar, 2014). To achieve this result, we first 
analysed the international literature, searching for 
determinants affecting firm-level corporate 
governance. We grouped the determinants into four 
categories: size, ownership structure, financial 
structure, and other variables. By doing so, we 
considered the particular characteristics of Italian 
companies (Melis, 1999) as well as political power 
(Roe, 2003) and the legal and financial environment 
(La Porta et al., 2008). 
 
3.1. Ownership structure 
 
The ownership variables are divided into four 
categories: the presence of a strong block holder, 
such as a family; state ownership; national 
institutional ownership; and the presence of foreign 
investors.  
The ownership of a company influences the 
composition of corporate governance (Nguyen & 
Faff, 2007; Yurtoglu, 2003; Salvioni & Gennari, 2016). 
The Italian corporate governance system is 
characterized by the presence of a strong block 
holder that is usually a family. In recent years there 
has been an increase in the presence of institutional 
investors (national and foreign) in company 
ownership. Some big groups have as a shareholder 
the Italian state, which could also have some special 
power (e.g., golden share). 
The ownership structure influences the quality 
of corporate governance (Lee, 2008). Dyck and 
Zingales (2004) show that ownership is more 
concentrated in countries in which private benefits 
of control are greater, or countries with weak legal 
protection for investors, like Italy (La Porta et 
al., 1999). In these countries, ownership 
concentration is an efficient form of governance to 
control manager activities (Wang, 2006), but it 
potentially leaves minority investors unprotected 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Johnson et al., 2000; La 
Porta et al., 2000; Claessens et al., 2002). Indeed, 
large controlling shareholders could use their 
influence on management to ensure a return on their 
investment even at the expense of minorities‟ 
expropriation, defining the type-two agency conflict 
(La Porta et al., 1999; 2002; Lemmon et al., 2003). 
This assumption is confirmed by Boubakri et al. 
(2005) and Bai et al. (2004), asserting that 
concentrated ownership gives to dominant 
shareholders substantial discretionary power to use 
the firm‟s resources for personal gain at the expense 
of other shareholders, and also facilitates their 
ability to manipulate internal governance 
mechanisms (Claessens et al., 2002; Dyck & 
Zingales, 2004; Huyghebaert & Wang, 2012). Recent 
studies found an inverse relation between ownership 
concentration and board independence, for many 
developed countries (Li, 1994; Kang et al., 2007). 
In family-controlled companies, the traditional 
agency relationship between owners and managers 
is reduced due to the ability of the controlling family 
to closely monitor managers (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Anderson & Reeb, 2003; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Moreover, top management 
is often dominated directly by family members or 
individuals who are very close to the controlling 
family (Corbetta & Minichilli, 2005). In this context, 
Hope et al. (2010) argue that it is easier to extract 
private benefits for major family owners, who can 
strongly influence the board or have the possibility 
of electing board members. Several studies show 
that large shareholders‟ expropriation of minority 
shareholders‟ wealth is even more achievable when 
companies record a poor quality of corporate 
governance. For example, Chen and Jaggi (2000) find 
that family ownership may reduce the independent 
director‟s effectiveness in convincing management 
to disclose more comprehensive information. Cheng 
and Firth (2006) find weak corporate governance and 
controls exercised by outside block holders and 
independent non-executive directors due to the 
overwhelming power of executive directors in family 
firms. Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that for S&P 
500 firms, outside directors are more prevalent in 
non-family firms than in family firms. 
Moreover, researchers find evidence suggesting 
that if families seek to entrench themselves and 
extract private benefits from the firm, the lack of 
strong external monitors and discipline agents 
potentially permits them to pursue this path. 
Conversely, corporate governance and the control 
system are directed to pursue the interests of all 
categories of shareholders, and corporate 
governance deals with the way in which all the 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Thus, to maintain the 
private benefit of control and pursue this return on 
their investment, large shareholders need a lower 
quality of corporate governance. 
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For Italian family-controlled companies, it has 
been shown that due to the lower substantial 
independence of board members, the board proves 
to be less effective in constraining some specific 
issues (Prencipe & Bar-Yosef, 2011). 
In our research, family ownership is 
represented by the percentage of shares owned by a 
single family. 
H1: We expect a significant relationship between 
family ownership and the CG index. 
Some researchers have shown that the presence 
of the state and national institutional ownership as a 
shareholder contributes to the prevention of frauds 
and the expropriation of wealth for minorities 
(Sun & Tong, 2003; Bianchi & Enriques, 2005; 
Kumar & Zattoni, 2018). Black et al. (2014) find that 
fractional ownership held by the state is the 
strongest predicting variable of corporate 
governance quality, proxied by the pooled CG index 
(pool observations across Brazil, India, Korea, and 
Turkey treat the country corporate governance 
indices as if they capture the same underlying 
construct). 
The role of national institutional investors can 
also have different effects on the structure of 
corporate governance (Brunello et al., 2003; Aguilera 
et al., 2018). However, the effects of the presence of 
state and national institutional investors on the 
corporate governance structure depend on the 
countries analysed. 
In our research, we defined two proxies to 
measure the presence of the institution: state 
ownership and national institutional ownership. 
State ownership is represented by the percentage of 
the shares owned by the state or state agencies. 
National institutional ownership is represented by 
the number of national institutional investors 
owning shares of the company. 
H2: We do not expect, in the Italian context, a 
clear relationship between state ownership and the 
CG index. 
H3: We do not expect, in the Italian context, a 
clear relationship between national institutional 
ownership and the CG index. 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005), the presence of block 
holders in a firm‟s ownership positively affects 
corporate governance processes, introducing an 
additional monitoring mechanism. McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) and Xu and Wang (1999) find that 
institutional investors appear to be more effective 
than individual shareholders in monitoring a firm‟s 
performance. Among these block holders, 
Balasubramanian et al. (2010) and Filatotchev et al. 
(2018) identify foreign investors as having a very 
important role; higher corporate governance is in 
their interest, and they are able to force the 
achievement of this goal due to the fact that they are 
willing to pay a higher price for equity, exerting 
greater pressure on managers. Khanna and 
Palepu (2000) argue that foreign-invested firms are 
likely to insist on higher governance standards and 
on the protection of minority rights. Foreign 
investors are able to prevent fraud in the Chinese 
financial market (Chen et al., 2006). Moreover, 
Bianchi et al. (2011) report that for the Italian 
market, higher levels of effective compliance to the 
Italian code of corporate governance (summarizing 
accepted worldwide best practices of corporate 
governance) tend to be found in companies with 
relevant holdings by institutional investors 
(particularly foreign investors) who participate in 
general shareholder meetings. Bianchi et al. (2011) 
claim that foreign investors are able to monitor the 
firms they invest in, helping to discourage financial 
fraud and improve the effectiveness of the internal 
control system. Bianchi et al. (2011) find positive 
relations between effective compliance with the 
Corporate Governance Code and foreign investors 
participating in annual meetings, for listed Italian 
companies. To investigate the factors affecting the 
IC index, we use the number of foreign funds 
holding relevant shares of the firm (percentage 
greater than 2%) as a proxy for foreign fund interest 
in the firm. 
H4: We expect a significant and positive 
relationship between the CG index and the presence 
of foreign investors. 
 
3.2. Firm size 
 
The corporate governance rules of a company are 
influenced by the company‟s complexity. Many 
studies have shown a correlation between the size of 
a company and the quality of the corporate 
governance (Fuerst & Kang, 2003; Kao & Chen, 2004; 
Kyereboah & Biekpe, 2007; Darmadi, 2011; Bajra & 
Cadez, 2018). The biggest companies need a more 
complex corporate governance system (LeeGompers 
et al., 2003; Barucci & Falini, 2005; Black et al., 2006; 
Cheung et al., 2008; Balasubramanian et al., 2010; 
Henry, 2010; Siregar et al., 2010; Black et al., 2011). 
Henry (2010) shows that there is a positive 
correlation between the natural logarithm of the 
revenues and the composition of corporate 
governance. Other studies have used the natural 
logarithm of the total assets (Chen et al., 2006; 
Ghazali, 2010; Hasanand & Ahmed, 2012; Swastika, 
2013). 
The natural logarithm of the sales and 
belonging to the FTSE MIB index are used as proxies 
of the firm size (Tulung & Ramdani, 2018). 
H5: We expect a significant and positive 
relationship between the CG index and one or more 
proxies of the firm size. 
 
3.3. Financial debts variables 
 
As previously mentioned, Jensen (1986) claims that 
financial leverage influences management choices; 
thus, in companies characterized by high financial 
debts, managers have less discretion in using 
generated cash flows. As a result, non-optimal 
investments are less probable. Furthermore, leverage 
can be used as a tool for regulating managers‟ 
behaviour, inasmuch as missing the debt repayment 
can lead to bankruptcy (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; 
Bajra & Cadez, 2018) and increasing debt level leads 
to a rise in interest expenses. 
Anderson et al. (2004) agree that the cost of 
debt financing is negatively related to board 
independence and audit committee independence, 
size, and meeting frequency. Their study focuses on 
bondholders‟ situation and thus on the accounting-
based debt covenant interpretation. Specifically, they 
conclude that bondholders consider the board and 
audit committee‟s monitoring effectiveness as a 
source of greater assurance with respect to the 
integrity of accounting numbers. These findings are 
confirmed by Chen et al. (2010), who assert that 
better governance structures are likely to have lower 
costs of equity and/or debt. Moreover, Bhojraj and 
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Sengupta (2003) provide evidence linking corporate 
governance mechanisms to higher bond ratings and 
lower bond yields. Governance mechanisms can 
reduce default risk by mitigating agency costs and 
monitoring managerial performance and by reducing 
information asymmetry between the firm and the 
lenders. Moreover, empirical findings by Piot et 
al. (2007) reveal that corporate governance quality 
has a significant reducing effect on the cost of debt, 
whereas audit quality does not. In summary, as long 
as financial debts are a tool to regulate management 
behaviour, increasing the quality of corporate 
governance is useful to mitigate interest expenses 
(Boubaker, 2007). However, improving corporate 
governance is more useful for high-levered firms. In 
our research, two items were used: leverage and the 
weight of interest on revenues. 
H6: We expect a significant and positive 
relationship between the CG index and the different 
configuration of the financial debts variables. 
 
3.4. Other variables 
 
To reduce the stochastic error we also considered 
two other variables. The first variable is the listing of 
a company in different international stock 
exchanges (Baker, 2009; Christenses, 2010). In 
particular, we consider the number of international 
stock exchanges in which each group is listed. 
H7: We do not expect a clear relationship 
between the CG index and the listing of a company in 
the different international stock exchanges. 
The second variable is the presence of an 
external auditor among the “big four”, which is a 
control variable (Qu, 2018). 
H8: We expect a significant and positive 
relationship between the CG index and the presence 
of “big four” external auditors. 
 
4. SAMPLE, METHOD, AND VARIABLES 
 
We tested the hypotheses using a sample consisting 
of all Italian companies listed on the FTSE-ALL-
SHARE index as of December 31, 2013. As shown in 
Table 1, of the 218 groups on the index that were 
analysed, 178 were non-financial entities and 40 
were financial entities. 
 
Table 1. Groups and sectors 
 
Sector Sample % sample 
Non-financial 178 81.7% 
Banking 16 7.3% 
Insurance 8 3.7% 
Financial services 16 7.3% 
Total 218 100% 
 
Our investigation focused on the 178 non-
financial groups since the financial groups have 
different corporate governance rules. Financial 
companies are subject to the supervision of the Bank 
of Italy and European Bank Authority (if banks) and 
the Italian Authority for Insurance companies named 
Institute for the Supervision of Insurance – IVASS (if 
insurance companies). Financial companies have to 
comply with several specific laws and rules whose 
aim is to strengthen the requirements of the 
members of the bodies of management and control. 
The objective of the legislation is to have robust 
governance arrangements, including a clear 
organizational structure, well-defined lines of 
responsibility, effective risk management processes, 
control mechanisms, and remuneration policies. The 
European Bank Authority (2017) revised the 
guidelines on internal governance whose aim is to 
further harmonize institutions‟ internal governance 
arrangements, processes, and mechanisms across 
the EU in line with the new requirements in this area 
introduced in the Capital Requirements Directive 
(CRD IV). The Guidelines put more emphasis on the 
duties and responsibilities of the management body 
in its supervisory function in risk oversight, 
including the role of their committees. They aim at 
improving the status of the risk management 
function, enhancing the information flow between 
the risk management function and the management 
body and ensuring effective monitoring of risk 
governance by supervisors (EBA). These 
requirements are applicable only by financial 
companies. Thus, we excluded financial companies 
from our analysis since their corporate governance 
rules are not comparable. 
Accordingly, we analysed 81.7% of all groups in 
Italy listed as of December 31, 2013. Out of the 178 
listed groups, we excluded 3 foreign entities that are 
subject to the legislative requirements of their 
country of origin, 4 groups that adopted non-
traditional corporate governance models (one-tier or 
two-tier systems), and 12 groups that did not 
present sufficient information to enable all the items 
needed to construct the CG index to be identified. 
The final sample thus consisted of 159 listed groups 
in Italy that adopted the traditional corporate 
governance model, as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Sample composition 
 
Item Sample 
Non-financial groups 178 
Foreign entities (3) 
Non-traditional corporate governance model (4) 
Insufficient information (12) 
Final sample 159 
 
For each group in the sample, we collected 15 
items to determine the CG index (dependent 
variable) and 10 items to identify the independent 
variables. A total of 3,975 items were collected. The 
information needed to construct the model was 
taken from the mandatory documents provided by 
groups (the corporate governance report). For 
financial data, the consolidated financial statements 
for the fiscal year of 2013 were analysed. No 
information other than that disclosed in the main 
corporate documents was used, i.e., no confidential 
documents, management reports, or unpublished 
documents were consulted (Lang et al., 2003). 
 
5. COMPOSITION INDEX CONFIGURATION 
 
There is extensive literature on the use of a 
disclosure index (Dscore) to investigate the level of 
information disclosed in consolidated financial 
statements (Marston et al., 1991). The Dscore is 
generally used to check the compliance of the notes 
to the financial statements (Devalle & Rizzato, 2012; 
2013; 2014). A number of studies have used the 
Dscore to demonstrate the compliance of specific 
non-financial information (Robba et al., 2001). 
In our investigation, the score, defined as the 
CG index, is used to demonstrate the compliance of 
corporate governance with the practices identified 
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through an analysis of the main internationally 
recognized corporate governance standards. 
The index was constructed primarily but not 
exclusively on the basis of the requirements of the 
Corporate Governance Code for companies listed in 
Italy. 
Specifically, the CG index is based on 
determining whether the quantitative requirements 
of the code are satisfied together with certain 
requirements of the most authoritative international 
corporate governance standards and the items used 
in the international scholarly literature on the topic. 
Two governance standards were used as sources. 
The main source was the 2011 Corporate 
Governance Code for companies listed in Italy, 
drawn up by the Italian Stock Exchange Committee 
for Corporate Governance. The second source 
constituted internationally recognized standards: 
the global governance principles developed by the 
International Corporate Governance Network and 
published in 2014 (abbreviated as GGP-ICGN in 
Table 3), and Italian law (in particular the “Draghi 
law”, law 58/1998, and the 231/2001 decree). 
The CG index consists of 14 items grouped into 
categories with specific investigative aims: 
composition of the board of directors, composition 
of internal committees and the role of 
representatives of minority shareholders, and 
auditors (Hay, 2017). 
The items used in constructing the index are 
shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Items used to construct the CG index 
 
CG index items 
Corporate 
Governance Code 
GGP-ICGN 
International 
studies 
Board composition 
1) Non-executive directors on board  Required Required Used 
2) Independent directors on board Required Required Used 
3) Independent chairmanship  Required Used 
4) Distinction between the chairman of the board and 
controlling the entity 
 Required Used 
5) Non-executive chairman  Required Used 
6) Distinction between the chief executive officer and 
chairman 
Required Required Used 
7) Lead independent director Required Required Used 
Composition of internal committees and role of representatives of minority shareholders 
8) Presence and composition of Audit and Risk Committee Required Required Used 
9) Presence and composition of Remuneration Committee Required Required Used 
10) Presence and composition of Nomination Committee Required Required Used 
11) Nomination and Remuneration Committees coincide   Used 
12) Directors nominated by minority shareholders on 
board 
 
 
Used 
13) Statutory auditors nominated by minority shareholders   Used 
Other 
14) Supervisory body pursuant to Legislative Decree 
231/2001 
Required 
 
 
15) Percentage of women directors on the board of the 
entity 
 
 
Used 
 
The Dscore configuration used in our model is 
shown below (Devalle et al. 2016): 
 
          
∑   
 
   
∑   
 
   
 (1) 
 
where          is the corporate governance 
compliance index for firm j, n is the number of 
items investigated; i are the items;    indicates 
whether or not the investigated item i is present 
(value is 1 if item i is present, and 0 if item i is not 
present);    indicates whether or not item i is 
relevant (value is 1 if item i is relevant, and 0 if item 
i is not relevant). The numerator of the CG index 
varies according to whether or not the investigated 
item is present, while the denominator varies 
according to whether or not the item is relevant. The 
method used to calculate each item and assign the 
associated score is shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Investigated items, calculation method, and assigned score (Part 1) 
 
Items Calculation method Score 
1) Non-executive directors on board   
                             
                     
 
if  <50% 
if           
if       
2) Independent directors on board   
                           
                             
       
3) Chairman is an independent director Dummy item 
Yes: 1 point 
No: 0 points 
4) Chairman controls issuer Dummy item 
Yes: 0 point 
No: 1 point 
5) Chairman is a non-executive director Dummy item 
Yes: 1 point 
No: 0 points 
6) Chief executive officer is also chairman of the board Dummy item 
Yes: 0 point 
No: 1 point 
7) There is a lead independent director Dummy item 
Yes: 1 point 
No: 0 points 
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Table 4. Investigated items, calculation method, and assigned score (Part 2) 
 
Items Calculation method Score 
8) Presence and composition of Audit and Risk 
Committee 
         
where:                            
                                
 
  
                           
                      
 
 
  
                             
                      
 
      
9) Presence and composition of Remuneration 
Committee 
        
where:                           
                                
 
  
                           
                      
 
 
  
                             
                      
 
      
10) Presence and composition of Nomination 
Committee 
      
where:                            
                                
 
  
                           
                      
 
      
11) Nomination and Remuneration Committees 
coincide 
Dummy item 
Yes: 0 points 
No: 1 point 
12) Directors nominated by minority shareholders on 
board 
Dummy item 
Yes: 0.5 points 
No: 0 point 
13) Statutory auditors nominated by minority 
shareholders 
Dummy item 
Yes: 0.5 points 
No: 0 points 
14) Supervisory body pursuant to Legislative Decree 
231/2001 
Dummy item 
Yes: 1 point 
No: 0 points 
15) Percentage of women directors on the board of the 
entity 
Comparison between % of women directors on 
the board of the entity (x) and the mean % of 
women directors on the board in the sample 
(17.19%) 
0 if  <17.19% 
1 if  ≥17.19% 
 
To prevent redundancy in the dependent 
variable and penalize some listed groups‟ CG index, 
certain items were counted in the index only if they 
were relevant. 
As an example, items 3, 4, 5, and 6 in Table 3 
were counted in the CG index as follows (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Role, characteristics, and independence of the chairman of the board: CG index counting method 
 
 
3) Is the chairman of the board an independent director? 
Yes 
(1 point) 
No 
(0 points) 
Not relevant: 
– question 4 
– question 5 
– question 6 
4) Does the chairman control the issuer? 
Yes 
(0 points) 
No 
(1 point) 
5) Is the chairman a non-executive director? 
Yes 
(1 point) 
No 
(0 points) 
Not relevant: 
question 6 
6) Is the CEO also chairman of the board? 
No 
(1 point) 
Total score 
1 point 
Total score 
0.5 points 
Yes 
(0 points) 
Total score 
0.25 points 
Total score 
0.33 points 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 16, Issue 1, Autumn 2018, Continued - 1 
 
225 
As can be seen from Figure 1, the impact of 
each item in calculating the CG index differs 
according to the board‟s operating structure. 
Following the method used in an earlier study 
(Tsalavoutas, 2011) to ensure the reliability of the 
research instrument, the authors and two 
independent researchers each scored 10 randomly 
selected companies. The findings of the three 
researchers were then compared. Since the final 
research instrument had been agreed upon by all the 
investigators, differences between the investigators‟ 
compliance scores were not significant. 
 
6. METHODOLOGY AND MEASUREMENT OF THE 
VARIABLE 
 
Our study used an ordinary least square regression 
model to determine the independent variables that 
can influence the CG index of groups listed on the 
Italian regulated market, in accordance with 
international literature in this area (Klapper & 
Love, 2002; We et al., 2003; Bebchuk & Cohen, 2005; 
Durnev & Kim, 2005; Brown & Caylor, 2006; 
Aggarwal et al., 2009). 
The general regression model is as follows: 
 
                                      
                      
                              
                         
(2) 
 
where           is the CG index for each 
entity j. 
As can be seen from the general model, the 
independent variables were divided into four 
categories to find the determinants of Italian groups‟ 
CG index, and specific independent variables were 
observed for each category. Specifically, we 
identified 4 independent variables for the Ownership 
Structure category, 2 independent variables for the 
Size Variable category, 2 independent variables for 
the Financial Debts Variable category, and 1 
independent variable for the Other Variable category 
(see Table 5). 
The OLS regression model used in our study is 
thus as follows: 
 
 
                                                                                      
                                                                           
                                    
(3) 
 
where: 
 
              Percentage of shares owned by a single family for entity j 
             Percentage of shares owned by state agencies for entity j 
                    Number of foreign funds owning shares in entity j 
                  Number of national institutional investors owning shares in entity j 
           Natural logarithm of sales for entity j 
        Inclusion in the FTSE-MIB index for entity j 
            Financial debts/total assets for entity j 
               Interest on revenues for entity j 
                   Number of exchanges on which entity j is listed 
                             External auditor is one of the “big four” 
 
Table 5. Independent variables and descriptive statistics 
 
Item 
Family 
_Own 
State 
_Own 
No._Foreign 
Funds 
Nat_Instit_O
wn 
Sales FTSE Leverage Inc_Fe_Rev 
Other_Stoc
k_Ex 
Big Four 
External 
Auditor 
Type of 
variable Numerical Numerical Numerical Numerical Numerical Dummy Numerical Numerical Numerical 
Dummy 
Control 
variable 
Classificat
ion of 
variable 
Ownership 
structure 
Ownership 
structure 
Ownership 
structure 
Ownership 
structure 
Size 
Variable 
Size 
variable 
Financial 
Debts 
variable 
Financial 
Debts 
variable 
Other 
variable 
Other 
variable 
Source of 
data 
Annual 
report – 
Consob 
databases 
Annual 
report – 
Consob 
databases 
Annual 
report – 
Consob 
databases 
Annual 
report – 
Consob 
databases 
Financial 
statement 
Italian 
Stock 
Exchang
e 
Financial 
statement 
Financial 
statement 
Website 
entity 
Annual 
report –
Consob 
Dataset 
No. of 
groups 
159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean .4035 .0500 .9308 .4026 3,130.4416  .3476 .0401 .9435 – 
Median .5100 .0000 1.0000 .0000 272.40  .3100 .0200 1.0000 – 
Std. 
Deviation 
.25790 .14428 1.14250 .81218 13,032.0528  .2366 .06925 1.08058 – 
Skewness -.568 2.976 1.478 2.796 6.930  1.606 3.526 1.638 – 
Kurtosis -1.173 7.929 2.437 9.573 50.397  5.272 14.004 3.145 – 
Min. .00 .00 .00 .00 3.55 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Max. .84 .69 6.00 5.00 114,722 1.00 1.63 .43 5.00 1.00 
 
Note: Table 5 summarizes the independent variables used in the model together with the descriptive statistics. 
 
As can be seen from Table 5, the independent 
variables are mostly numerical variables, with the 
exception of the independent variable FTSE and Big 
Four External Auditor, which are dummy variables. 
The fact that there are only two dummy variables 
limits the risk of multicollinearity between the 
independent variables in the model. It should also be 
noted that there are no missing values. 
The first category of variables is Ownership 
Structure and is broken down into four sub-
categories. 
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The first sub-category is Family Ownership. It is 
a numerical variable calculated as the ratio of the 
number of shares owned by the same family (or by 
an individual belonging to this family) to the total 
number of shares traded on the stock exchange. As 
can be seen from the descriptive statistics, there is a 
high level of family ownership in the sample, with a 
mean of 40.35%. The median is close to the mean; 
the frequency distribution of the percentage of 
family ownership is close to being a normal 
distribution. The standard deviation also 
demonstrates this characteristic. The skewness of     
–.568 indicates that the frequency distribution of 
family ownership is right-skewed. The kurtosis index 
of –1.173 indicates that the frequency distribution is 
platykurtic. 
The variable State_Own refers to state 
ownership and is the ratio of the shares held by 
state agencies to the total number of shares traded 
on the regulated market. Table 5 shows that the 
state‟s mean percentage equity interest in listed 
Italian companies is 5%, with a maximum of 69%. 
The median is .0, showing that despite the maximum 
and mean values, the government does not have 
shareholdings in 50% of the analysed groups. The 
percentage of state ownership shows a highly 
leptokurtic left-skewed distribution (kurtosis 7.929, 
skewness 2.976). 
Ownership Structure was also investigated 
using the variables No._Foreign_Funds, which 
indicates the number of foreign funds with holdings 
in the groups, and Nat_Instit_Own, which indicates 
the number of national institutional investors. 
Table 5 shows that 50% of the listed groups in the 
sample have no more than one foreign fund, while 
50% do not have institutional investors. 
The second category of variables is Size, 
operationalized in the model as the natural 
logarithm of sales (Ln_Rev) and inclusion in the 
FTSE-MIB market index (FTSE). The FTSE-MIB index, 
in fact, is the main benchmark for the Italian stock 
markets. It represents around 80% of domestic 
market capitalization and consists of leading high-
liquidity firms in Italy‟s various Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) sectors. The FTSE MIB 
index is market capitalization weighted after 
adjusting constituents for float. It thus includes the 
listed Italian groups with the highest market value. 
For this reason, unlike other similar studies (Cheung 
et al., 2008; Bianchi et al., 2011) but following the 
procedure adopted by Barucci and Falini (2005) in 
Italy as well as at the international level (Black et al., 
2006; Balasubramanian et al., 2010; Henry, 2010), 
market value was not considered as an independent 
variable to avoid multicollinearity between the 
independent variables market capitalization and 
inclusion in the FTSE index. 
Sales show a sample mean of 3.13 billion euros, 
with a median of 272 million euros. As the mean and 
the median are very far apart, the frequency 
distribution of sales departs from its normal 
distribution. The standard deviation (13.03 billion 
euros) confirms this assumption, as it shows that 
sales revenues are widely dispersed around the 
mean. The frequency distribution is left-skewed 
(skewness 6.930) and leptokurtic (kurtosis 50.397). 
Given its construction, the sales variable is always 
positive, with a minimum of 3 million euros and a 
maximum of 114.72 billion euros. To reduce 
variability, we chose to use the logarithmic 
transformation of sales (Ln_Sales), as has been the 
practice in the literature in this area (Black et al. 
2006; Balasubramanian et al., 2010; Henry, 2010).  
The second size variable used in our study is 
FTSE. It is a dummy variable whose value is 1 if the 
group in question is included in the FTSE-MIB 
market index and 0 if it is not. 
The third category of independent variables is 
Financial Debts and is the dimension that 
characterizes our model and our study. The 
objective of these variables is to consider the effect 
of the level of financial indebtedness and its 
economic sustainability on the composition of 
corporate governance. As our measure of 
indebtedness, we used leverage, calculated as the 
ratio of financial debt to total assets, while our 
measure of the economic sustainability of 
indebtedness was the ratio of financial expenses 
given in the income statement to revenues 
(Inc_Fe_Rev). 
Table 5 shows that the analysed groups have a 
meaningful financial debt amounting to 34.76% of 
total assets, while the median is 31%. The small 
difference between the mean and the median 
indicates that the frequency distribution of leverage 
is close to the normal distribution. The maximum 
financial debt of listed Italian groups amounts to 
163%, the value reached in groups with negative 
equity. The variable Inc_Fe_Rev also shows a mean 
(4.01%) close to the median. Here again, the 
frequency distribution is thus close to its normal 
distribution. The maximum value reached by 
financial expenses as a percentage of revenues is 
43%. Both leverage and financial expenses as a 
percentage of revenues have a leptokurtic left-
skewed distribution. This is demonstrated by the 
positive values for both skewness (1.606 in the case 
of leverage and 3.526 in the case of financial 
expenses as a percentage of revenues) and kurtosis 
(5.272 for leverage and 14.004 for financial expenses 
as a percentage of revenues). 
The last independent variables considered in 
the model represent listing in more than one 
regulated market (Other_Stock_Ex) and the external 
auditor. 
As can be seen from Table 5, the variable 
Other_Stock_ex assumes a maximum value of 5, 
while the mean and median are close to 1. These 
values indicate that, on average, the analysed groups 
are listed on a single regulated market, while a few 
exceptions are listed on more than one. 
External Auditor is a control variable to verify if 
the external auditor is a member of the “big four”. 
Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics for the 
dependent variable. 
 
Table 6. Dependent variable and descriptive statistics 
 
Variable No. of items Missing Mean Median Std. deviation Skewness Kurtosis Min. Max. 
CG index 159 0 .5686 .5767 .11397 -.562 .710 .12 .80 
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Table 6 indicates that the mean CG index is 
56.86%. Thus, though the compliance with corporate 
governance of listed Italian groups is above 50% on 
average, it is still far from optimal. The median value 
(57.67%) is very close to the mean, showing that the 
CG index frequency distribution is close to its 
normal distribution. 
In addition, the CG index frequency 
distribution is right-skewed (skewness –.562) with 
kurtosis of .710. 
As can also be seen, the minimum value 
reached by the dependent variable is 12%, while the 
maximum is 80%. None of the groups reach a CG 
index of 100%. 
The mean and the median values of the 
dependent variable, together with the fact that there 
were no groups with a corporate governance 
compliance score of 100%, justify our study‟s 
objective of determining which independent 
variables are capable of influencing the corporate 
governance of groups listed on the Italian market. 
 
7. RESULTS 
 
To use the OLS model, there must be no 
multicollinearity between the independent variables, 
and the stochastic error terms must not be affected 
by heteroscedasticity. 
To check for multicollinearity between the 
independent variables, we used the correlations 
matrix and Pearson‟s coefficient (Table 7). 
 
Table 7. Pearson‟s correlation coefficient 
 
Variables Items 
Family 
Own 
State 
Own 
No.Foreig
n Funds 
Nat. 
Instit. 
Own 
Ln(Sale) Lev. FTSE 
Other 
Stock Ex. 
Inc. 
Fe.Rev. 
Big_Four
_External
_Auditor 
Family Own 
Pearson 
Corr. 
1          
 Sig. (2-tailed)           
 No. 159          
State Own 
Pearson 
Corr. 
-.294** 1         
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000          
 No. 159 159         
No.Foreigg 
Funds 
Pearson 
Corr. 
-.081 .127 1        
 Sig. (2-tailed) .311 .110         
 N. 159 159 159        
Nat. Instit. Own 
Pearson 
Corr. 
-.203* .333** .025 1       
 Sig. (2-tailed) .010 .000 .752        
 No. 159 159 159 159       
Ln(Sales) 
Pearson 
Corr. 
-.163* .080 .290** -.158 1      
 Sig. (2-tailed) .040 .313 .000 .048       
 No. 159 159 159 159 159      
Lev. 
Pearson 
Corr. 
-.074 -.109 -.181* .103 -.179 1     
 Sig. (2-tailed) .355 .170 .022 .196 .024      
 No. 159 159 159 159 159 159     
FTSE 
Pearson 
Corr. 
-.217** .117 .292** -.096 .564** -.040 1    
 Sig. (2-tailed) .006 .142 .000 .232 .000 .618     
 N. 159 159 159 159 159 159 159    
Other Stock Ex. 
Pearson 
Corr. 
-.167 .032 .253** -.123 .471** -.101 .403** 1   
 Sig. (2-tailed) .036 .688 .001 .123 .000 .206 .000    
 No. 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159   
Inc. Fe.Rev. 
Pearson 
Corr. 
-.141 .005 -.088 .185* -.252** .477** -.013 -.052 1  
 Sig. (2-tailed) .077 .950 .269 .020 .001 .000 .871 .516   
 No. 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159  
Big_Four_Exter
nal_Auditor 
Pearson 
Corr. 
-.051 .069 .172* .052 .341** -.178* .160* .186* -.067 1 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .519 .386 .030 .517 .000 .025 .043 .019 .404  
 No. 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 
 
Note: * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
         ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
As can be seen from Table 7, there are no significant 
correlations between the independent variables. This 
is demonstrated by the values of the Pearson‟s 
coefficient. 
There is only one case where the Pearson‟s 
coefficient exceeds .500. It is the potential 
correlation between inclusion in the FTSE-MIB index 
(FTSE) and the natural logarithm of sales (Ln(Sales)), 
with a Pearson‟s coefficient of .564. In any case, all 
Pearson‟s coefficients are below the threshold value 
of .700. 
To apply the OLS model, it is also necessary to 
check that there is no heteroscedasticity. This 
involves checking that the variance of the standard 
error is constant for each observation. For this 
purpose, we used two different approaches: a 
graphic method and the White test. The results of 
the White test show an R2 equal to .1761 with a 
p-value for the “Significance level of Chi-square 
df= P (H0: Homoscedasticity)” of .1401. As this p-
value is greater than .05, the hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity must be accepted. It can thus be 
concluded that the model is not subject to 
heteroscedasticity. 
After determining that there is no 
multicollinearity and no heteroscedasticity, we can 
conclude that the regression parameters are 
unbiased. 
The regression results are shown in Table 8. 
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Table 8. Regression results 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient (  ) 
Ownership structure variables 
   Family Own. -.095*** 
   State Own. -.060 
   No. Foreign Funds .022*** 
   Nat. Instit. Own. -.026 
Size variables 
   Ln(Sales) .014*** 
   FTSE -.007 
Financial debts variables 
   Leverage .074* 
   Inc. Fe. Rev. .002 
Other variables 
   Other Stock Ex. .011 
    Big Four External Auditor .046* 
F  4.621*** 
    .238 
N  159 
 
Note: *Significant p-value < 0.10 (two tailed); **Significant p-value < 0.05 (two tailed); ***Significant p-value < 0.01 (two tailed) 
 
As Table 8 shows, the model‟s F-test value is 
4.621 with a p-value of less than 0.01; we can thus 
reject the null hypothesis that all regression 
parameters are zero and conclude that the model is 
significant. The R2 of .238 is an acceptable value, 
especially considering the subjective nature of the 
dependent variable. 
Regarding our findings, it should be noted that 
the CG index of Italian groups differs according to 
the analysed category (Ownership Structure, 
Performance Variable, Size Variable, etc.) and, 
especially, according to the specific independent 
variable (Ln(Sales), FTSE, etc.) used to determine the 
category. 
In detail, with reference to size, previous 
studies demonstrated that there is a positive 
significant relationship between the level of 
corporate governance and market capitalization in 
emerging markets (Black, 2001) or, in Italy, that 
there is a positive significant relationship between 
corporate governance best practices and firm size 
(Barucci & Falini, 2005). In our study, we used the 
natural logarithm of sales and inclusion in the 
FTSE-MIB Italian stock market index as size variable 
items instead of market capitalization. As our 
findings show, the natural logarithm influences the 
CG index with a p-value under .01. Specifically, the 
influence of the natural logarithm of sales on the CG 
index is significant (p-value < .01) and positive 
(   = .014). 
By contrast, the inclusion of the analysed group 
in the FTSE-MIB index is not significant. This means 
that the groups in our study, which represent 
around 80% of the domestic market and are leading 
high-liquidity firms in Italy‟s various ICB sectors, are 
not those that, on the whole, have a higher quality of 
CG index. 
The category Ownership Structure is significant 
as regards the structure of the Italian groups‟ 
corporate governance. In particular, the results 
demonstrate that the percentage of shares held by 
(or traceable to) a single family significantly 
(p-value < .01) and negatively (   = – .095) influences 
the CG index. A 1 percent increase in family 
ownership corresponds to a .184% drop in the CG 
index. 
As the analysis of the situation in Italy shows, 
corporate governance is characterized by the 
presence of a single family or a single strong block 
holder. This highlights the fact that family 
ownership has a negative influence on the quality of 
corporate governance in Italy from the standpoint of 
board composition (presence of independent 
directors, non-executive directors, etc.) as well as the 
presence and composition of internal committees 
(audit and risk committee, remuneration committee, 
etc.). This conclusion is extremely important for 
studies of corporate governance. Despite the many 
legislative changes that have been introduced in 
recent years, the quality of governance decreases 
when one family has a majority interest. 
The number of foreign funds with equity 
holdings also has a significant (p-value < .01) 
influence on the quality of the Italian groups‟ 
corporate governance. Here, however, the substantial 
difference is that the influence is positive (   = .022). 
This means that the higher the number of foreign 
funds with holdings in the Italian groups, the higher 
the compliance with the main internationally 
recognized corporate governance standards and the 
Italian Corporate Governance Code. 
This finding reinforces our previous 
observation: the preponderance of family ownership 
that characterizes the Italian market lowers the 
quality of corporate governance as well as the 
protection afforded to minority shareholders. By 
contrast, having foreign funds among the investors 
improves the composition of the management and 
auditing bodies, laying the foundations for better 
protection of minority shareholders. 
The CG index is not significantly affected by 
state ownership, i.e., the ratio of the shares held by 
state agencies to the total number of shares traded 
on the regulated market. In other words, having the 
government as an investor is not a guarantee of 
better corporate governance in Italian listed groups. 
This finding is characteristic of the Italian market, as 
previous studies have demonstrated a negative 
relationship between state ownership and the 
quality of corporate governance, as is the case in the 
French market (Ben Ali & Lesage, 2013). 
The number of national institutional investors 
holding shares in listed Italian groups, on the other 
hand, does not have a significant impact on the CG 
index. 
As Table 8 shows, the category of Financial 
Debts Variables, which focuses on the leverage of the 
analysed groups and economic sustainability, 
expressed as financial expenses as a percentage of 
revenues, also influences the composition of 
corporate governance. This finding is particularly 
important against the backdrop of international 
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studies, as it points to a specific characteristic of the 
Italian market, where average leverage and financial 
expenses are higher than those of groups listed on 
other European markets. Leverage has a significant 
(p-value < .01) and positive (   = .223) influence on 
the quality of corporate governance and its 
compliance with international standards. As Italian 
listed groups‟ exposure to credit institutions 
increases, so does their likelihood of having a 
corporate governance system that complies with the 
Italian code and guarantees that the board of 
directors can perform its functions effectively. 
This finding indicates that listed Italian groups‟ 
dependence on third parties for debt capital tends to 
increase the quality and compliance of corporate 
governance. 
The economic sustainability of debt, instead, 
has no impact on the board of listed groups in Italy. 
This result means that the level of financial debt is 
the main driver for the corporate governance 
structure about the category Financial Debts 
Variables, while the economic sustainability of debt 
could be a direct consequence of the corporate 
governance structure and the level of financial 
debts. 
Table 8 shows that listing on more than one 
stock exchange also has no significant influence on 
the groups‟ CG index. 
Lastly, as evidenced in previous studies, the 
external auditor has a significant influence on the 
structure of corporate governance. For this reason, 
in our study, this variable has been a control 
variable. 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Our research investigated the structure of the 
corporate governance system of a company and 
compliance with the Italian Corporate Governance 
Code and other international standards of corporate 
governance. 
Results showed a moderate level of compliance 
of the CG index applied to the Italian market. This is 
consistent with previous research that considered 
the Italian corporate governance system weak: there 
is a high degree of direct ownership concentration, 
both for listed and unlisted companies (Bianco & 
Casavola, 1999; Enriques & Volpin, 2007), there is a 
pyramidal firm structure, and there is low protection 
for minorities. 
A regression model was run to test the 
determinants that influence the CG index. As stated 
in previous paragraphs, the Italian corporate 
governance system is characterized by the presence 
of a strong block holder that is usually a family. 
Findings show that family ownership has a 
significant and negative correlation with the CG 
index. This means that where the family is the main 
shareholder the quality and compliance of the CG 
index is lower. Additionally, the presence of foreign 
investors increases the quality of the CG index. 
This finding reinforces our previous 
observation: the preponderance of family ownership 
that characterizes the Italian market lowers the 
quality of corporate governance as well as the 
protection afforded to minority shareholders. By 
contrast, having foreign funds among the investors 
improves the composition of the management and 
auditing bodies, laying the foundations for better 
protection of minority shareholders. 
We investigated a specific characteristic of the 
Italian market, that is, the leverage. Leverage is 
higher in Italian listed companies than for groups 
listed on other European markets. We found that 
leverage has a significant and positive influence on 
the compliance of corporate governance with 
international standards. These results might be of 
interest to practitioners and regulators to increase 
the compliance of the corporate governance of 
Italian companies. Moreover, the results of this 
research also will be useful for legislators to define 
the mandatory or voluntary composition of 
corporate governance to reinforce the protection of 
shareholders (Park, 2018). 
The limitations of this research are the 
following: first, the analysis is based on a single 
country (Italy) and second the research refers to only 
one year. Next steps in this stream of research will 
be to improve the analysis of the composition, 
compliance, and quality of corporate governance in 
comparison to other European countries to verify 
how the country variable influences the features of 
corporate governance. Furthermore, the research 
should be improved by analyzing the evolution of 
the compliance and quality of the corporate 
governance rules, considering a longer period of 
time.  
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